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Narrating Resuscitation: Theory, Knowledge, and the Cultural Life of Eighteenth-Century 
Vitalism 
But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life1 
 
In Maria Edgeworth’s novel, Belinda (1801), there is a little remarked moment in 
which the “suspended animation” of Clarence Hervey is restored, following his near-
drowning in the Serpentine.2 The name of the man who has such powers over “animation” 
is Dr X. Whilst “X” suggests his name is unknown, it might also be understood as the 
necessary obscuring of an identity which is otherwise all too legible; indeed, the novel 
seems almost as interested in revealing Dr X’s identity as obscuring it. He is “Dr X—the 
writer” (93), a “literary philosophic physician” (317) of “wit” (95), “genius” (93), and “great 
literary reputation” (111) who, “in judging of the human character,” warns against “entirely 
trust[ing] to analogies and allusions taken from the vegetable creation” (112). Vegetable 
analogies debated by a witty, philosophical, literary physician suggest Erasmus Darwin, 
author of The Botanic Garden (1792), which playfully deployed analogies between plants 
and humans to extend a “spirit of animation” onto vegetable life.  
That Darwin, the pre-eminent literary botanical author of the age, might lurk in a 
novel which repeatedly links botany with reason and modesty is perhaps not surprising.3 But 
Dr X’s expertise in restoring the powers of “animation,” in the first scene in which he 
appears in the novel, equally points to Darwin. Both The Botanic Garden and Darwin’s 
medical treatise Zoonomia (1794-6) attempt to theorise the very powers of animation which 
are also the object of the practice of resuscitation from which Hervey benefits at Dr X’s 
hands. Meanwhile, Hervey’s resuscitation combines the credible and probabilistic (his 
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recovery) with the mysterious and unknown (Dr X’s identity; the exact means by which the 
recovery is achieved); and it incorporates into realist novelistic discourse an event – 
recovery of the dead – a full explanation of which remained beyond contemporary medical 
understanding. Like Dr X himself, something was both partially revealed, and remained 
hidden in resuscitation, a practice which, despite its uncertain epistemological status, 
residing somewhere between proven fact and object of speculation, was nevertheless 
accommodated in Edgeworth’s novel. It was arguably this potent mix of mystery (the 
unknowability of exactly how resuscitation is achieved) and the resonant, undeniable, 
experiential evidence of successful resuscitation which gave resuscitation narratives their 
fascination — exploited by Edgeworth to provide a dramatic first entrance for Dr X, a central 
moral authority in her novel.4 As David Hume observed, the miraculous gives rise to the 
“agreeable emotion” of “surprise and wonder,” not only for those who experience it 
directly, but even for those who cannot believe “those miraculous events, of which they are 
informed.”5 Whilst this tendency of the mind to give pleasurable credence to observed 
events is at the heart of Hume’s sceptical attack on knowledge of causation — and hence on 
mechanical natural philosophy — Belinda demonstrates how it can also be exploited by 
fiction. This paper explores how the mix of mystery and fact presented in the scene of 
animation, and manifested by the resuscitated body as the site of such a compelling 
conjunction, is negotiated in contemporary scientific theories of life and theoretical 
reflections on natural philosophical method; it also addresses responses to the uniquely 
suggestive event of resuscitation in cultural and political domains. The scientific unknowns 
addressed by reanimation, I suggest, make peculiarly fertile ground for cultural responses of 
various kinds, not only in novels, but also in social theory and political critique. 
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 By the time Belinda was published, the practice of resuscitation of the drowned was 
well-established, following the founding of Humane Societies across Europe and America 
from 1767 onwards.6 (The association of resuscitation with being “humane” is perhaps 
referenced in the repeated description of Dr X as “benevolent.”). The most famous literary 
treatment of resuscitation, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, whose eponymous protagonist 
seeks to “bestow animation upon lifeless matter” and “renew life where death had 
apparently devoted the body to corruption,” and which features at least four instances of 
resuscitation, attempted or achieved (including one attempt to revive a drowned person) 
had yet to appear; but Shelley’s mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, had been the beneficiary of 
resuscitation following an attempt to drown herself in 1795.7 Fiction’s exploitation of the 
sensational possibilities of a return to life from apparent death continued well into the 
nineteenth century, as suggested, for instance, by Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), where 
Lucy’s reanimation is achieved through the same techniques as were recommended by late 
eighteenth-century advocates of resuscitation. Fictional treatments of resuscitation more 
contemporary with Edgeworth appear in Frances Burney’s The Wanderer (1814) and 
Thomas Holcroft’s Anna St. Ives (1792).8  
The practice of resuscitation in Britain from the second half of the eighteenth 
century was accompanied by theoretical explanations of the practice. This paper particularly 
addresses links between resuscitation and vitalist medicine and physiology, especially that 
associated with the Edinburgh medical school, a noted centre for vitalist medicine in this 
period. Any explanatory account of resuscitation requires a theory of life, and vitalist 
approaches in burgeoning biological and physiological sciences from the mid-century 
marked a sustained effort to provide that, especially as an alternative to natural 
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philosophy’s otherwise dominant mechanism. In the words of Peter Hanns Reill, vitalism’s 
attempt to understand the operation of life in the material body entailed “positing … a 
capacity lying between the extremes of mind and body where real reality was located, and 
proposing a new theory of matter, activated by vital forces or principles.”9 Darwin’s 
supposition of the existence of a “living principle, or spirit of animation, which resides 
throughout the body, without being cognizable to our senses, except by its effects,” is 
representative of this approach, yet, as with many such vitalist suppositions, the exact 
nature of the “living principle, or spirit of animation” which he postulates remained unclear. 
Whilst it might be an “immaterial agent supposed to exist in or with matter” but 
nevertheless “quite distinct from it,” an animating agency or force might equally be “matter 
of a finer kind.”10  
Darwin’s rather hedged account of an either material or immaterial “spirit of 
animation” is characteristic of the looseness with which any vital principle was sketched, 
and indicative of the challenges faced by those working to establish a “new ontology” for 
the life sciences.11 These challenges were two-fold. Not only was it recognised that it was 
impossible to explain vital motions of living bodies (the circulation of the blood, the actions 
of digestion, muscles, the reflex, and so on) through mechanical models, but the minuteness 
of many body parts — the “hidden parts of nature” — resisted empirical examination.12 
Newtonian analogy, or the deployment of a “provisionally inexplicable explicative device” 
presented one methodological solution; as Newton had with gravity, the postulation of an 
unknown would enable regularities to be deduced from it, compensating for the difficulty of 
identifying an animating force whilst sustaining empirical investigation into living bodies.13 
Darwin’s “living principle, or spirit of animation,” in both its looseness, and in the support it 
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provided for the immense apparatus of his knowledge of, and speculations, about the living 
body, operates as such a postulated unknown.  
Vitalism in medicine and physiology thus operated in a very particular 
epistemological space, characterised by the supposition of a life force or principle which it 
was unable to identify or further explicate; yet in this principle nothing less than the 
difference between life and death was assumed to lie.14 The particular attraction which 
resuscitation held for vitalist sciences of life thus becomes clear, as the practice of 
resuscitation addressed precisely the mystery at their heart: the difference between a living 
body and a dead one. Resuscitation suggested the possibility of supplementing necessarily 
“provisionally inexplicable” explications with demonstrable evidence via the reanimated 
body; yet at the same time, the reanimated body also presented medical practice at its most 
dramatically efficacious despite a lack of knowledge of the cause of its success. Medical 
literature on resuscitation shows that, whilst broad agreement existed (barring some small 
variations) over methods for the recovery of drowned persons, theoretical explanations of 
the practice and reasons for its success varied widely.15 Instead, the mystery of life itself 
reverberates both in medical literature on resuscitation and in other cultural forms 
responding to the practice. If medical accounts of resuscitation exploited the ‘provisionally 
inexplicable’ to offer believable, even miraculous, narratives of medical treatment and 
intervention, the second part of my paper shows how narratives of resuscitation were also 
taken in a different direction. 
* 
When the tale of eighteenth-century resuscitation is told, its connections to Scottish 
vitalism are not often emphasised.16 John Fothergill’s reading to the Royal Society, in 1745, 
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of Scottish surgeon William Tossach’s account of his resuscitation of a miner, is usually 
identified as leading to the foundation of the Royal Humane Society in 1774.17 But Tossach’s 
account was also read to the Edinburgh Medical Society, and published in its Medical Essays 
and Observations in 1746.18 This audience is important, as the Medical Society was closely 
associated with attempts, from the 1740s onwards, to reject the iatromechanism dominant 
at Edinburgh since the founding of the medical school in 1726, and to develop alternative 
vitalist theories.19 Robert Whytt’s Essay on the Vital and other Involuntary Motions of 
Animals (1751), presented to the Society, exemplifies the new physiology of Edinburgh 
vitalism: involuntary bodily actions were explained through postulated notions of organic 
conjunction and active forces, including a sentient principle, superadded to animal fibres to 
give them power of sensation and generating motion.20 
According to Sean Quinlan, Edinburgh at this time was “electrified” by new work on 
apparent death by Parisian doctor Jacques-Bénigne Winslow.21 Winslow’s work, which 
appeared in various editions throughout the 1740s, mooted the possibility of life continuing 
even after apparent death, making clear the tantalising possibility of recovering the 
seemingly dead back to life. Winslow’s work clearly connected with Tossach’s account of the 
resuscitation of the miner; indeed, that account was reprinted in at least one of Winslow’s 
works.22 Tossach resuscitated the miner by blowing air into his mouth, and his account also 
lists other interventions which were to become part of the canon of resuscitation advice: 
letting blood; letting the subject be “pulled, pushed and rubbed, to assist the motion of his 
blood as much as I could;” washing the face with water; rubbing “sal volatile on his nose and 
lips,” and so on. Tossach offers no explanation for the success of his intervention, but a 
footnote at the end of his account in the Medical Essays refers the reader to Edinburgh 
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physician John Stephenson’s “Essay on the cause of animal heat, and of some of the effects 
of heat and cold on our bodies,” published in an earlier volume of the Medical Essays, which 
Tossach claims accounts “handsomely” for “this extraordinary affair.”23  
Stephenson’s essay rejects previous explanations of recoveries from apparent death 
founded on the undetected continuation of the heart and lungs, and offers his own theory 
of animal heat, whereby, in a process akin to fermentation or putrefaction, changes in 
minute parts of bodily fluids stimulate the heart to restore its motion and restart circulation, 
and thereby restore life. He asserts that “after the motion of the heart, arteries and lungs 
ceases, there often remains a small degree of a vital principle, but such a degree as well 
merits attention…. After a full stop of all those organic motions on which life is said to 
depend, the juices frequently retain so much of the animal process, as in many instances 
serves to maintain warmth for a long time; and in others with proper cherishing might 
restore life entirely” (239). It is this notion of animal heat, not the recovery of the 
apparently dead, which is the main focus of Stephenson’s essay, but it is notable that, in a 
pattern to be continued in writings by William Cullen, John Hunter, and others, recovery 
from the dead offers occasion for the elaboration of a theory of organic function, in part 
propounded via the notion of a ‘vital principle’, elaborated with varying degrees of precision 
and specificity.  
The essay is also notable – in another recurring note in medical writing on 
resuscitation literature – for Stephenson’s rejection of mechanical methods, and for his 
assertion of the need to find explanatory models more appropriate for, and specific to, the 
living body.24 Rejecting friction as a cause for animal heat, he asserts that it is “an 
unphilosophic partiality for the mechanics to maintain, that our juices have all their heat 
8 
 
communicated to them from the solids” (243). Rather, “the minute component parts of 
solids, have a set of laws peculiar to them, and their intimate changes and actions on one 
another, are not to be accounted for by the coarser mechanical laws” (232). He rejects the 
“pomp of mathematical science” and suggests that instead “the plain truth must come out” 
(226). Meanwhile, Stephenson’s linking of the principle of life to animal heat can be seen to 
inform practical advice in resuscitation literature, where there is frequently an emphasis on 
heating the body through placing it near fire, rubbing, wrapping in blankets, and so on. This 
(again characteristic) conjunction of specific practical curative advice within a larger 
theoretical context marked by both vehement assertions of the specific nature of life, and 
methods of investigations of it, together with an absence of anything other than 
‘provisionally inexplicable’ accounts of vital operations, is striking. The very repeated 
elaboration (and, presumably, enactment) of what were to become such canonical rituals in 
resuscitation practice masks the dependence, within theories of life, and especially 
following their rejection of mathematical methods, on the supposition of unknown 
principles, forces, or operations, to which life itself could be traced. Far from, in 
Stephenson’s words, “the plain truth” coming out, the scene of resuscitation instead 
enabled suppositions and hypotheses about the nature of life and its operation to attain a 
kind of authority and acceptance, through their association with an apparatus of practical 
recovery treatments which were able, at least on sufficient occasion, to demonstrate real 
efficacy. 
* 
 Written thirty years after Stephenson, William Cullen’s Letter to Lord Cathcart (1776) 
offers a quite different account of the vital principle which sustains life after apparent 
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death, whilst also yoking that account to a remarkably familiar litany of recommended 
resuscitation practices. Cullen was, with Whytt and others, a prominent (and at points 
controversial) figure in the development of vitalism at Edinburgh.25 He lectured in chemistry 
at Glasgow University from 1747, and later succeeded Robert Whytt as professor of 
medicine at Edinburgh; his contributions in both fields were strongly vitalist. His teaching 
was received as a significant, even outrageous, corrective to the dominant iatromechanism, 
to the extent that Cullen was formally warned by the Provost against bringing the university 
into disrepute. However, his lectures on medicine, published as First Lines of the Practice of 
Physic (1777), with its assertion that the reactions of the body were very different to 
mechanical actions, became “one of the most important late eighteenth century correctives 
to Boerhaave,” and his Nosology (1769) was in print continually into the early nineteenth 
century.26 
 By 1776, Cullen had become the prominent medical authority at Edinburgh; in this 
capacity he was asked to provide a summary of advice regarding resuscitation practices.27 
As in Stephenson’s account, Cullen asserts that life “does not immediately cease upon the 
cessation of the action of the lungs and heart, and the consequent ceasing of the circulation 
of the blood.” But, whereas Stephenson had looked to animal heat and the chemical 
processes of bodily fluids for an explanation of the recovery of life, Cullen – in line with 
Edinburgh’s focus on the nervous system – identifies the sensibility and irritability of the 
nerves and fibres as the condition in which the vital principle consists:   
Though the circulation of the blood is necessary to the support of life, the living 
state of animals does not consist in that alone, but especially depends upon a 
certain condition in the nerves, and muscular fibres, by which they are sensible 
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and irritable, and upon which the action of the heart itself depends. It is this 
condition, therefore which may be properly called the vital principle in animals; 
and as long as this subsists, or though much weakened, as long as it can be 
again restored to its activity and vigour, while, at the same time, the 
organisation of the parts remains entire, it is presumed, that the action of the 
heart and lungs, the circulation of the blood, and therefore all the functions of 
life, may also, though they have many of them long ceased, be again entirely 
restored.28 
This is as much theoretical detail as Cullen gives in the Letter; the remainder of the 
document suggests a range of measures for the recovery of the apparently dead, many of 
which echo Stephenson in their emphasis on warming and stimulating the body. But where 
Stephenson had speculated that heat would stimulate changes in bodily fluids which in turn 
would stimulate the action of the heart, Cullen’s implication is that animal heat is necessary 
for the operation of the “vital principle” in the nerves, and that stimulation of the body’s 
irritability would thereby “restore the activity of the whole system.”29 There is no further 
elaboration of how this might come about, however; instead, theoretical statement gives 
way to an extended account of practical interventions and resuscitation treatments, whose 
efficacy is implied not only by its relation to the loosely-sketched medical theory, but also by 
its detail and length. This relation between theory and practice in the Letter brings about its 
own particular effects within the rhetorical economy of the text. The possibility of 
resuscitation, insisted on by the very length and detail of means to that end, supplements 
and eclipses the opacity of the “vital principle,” vitalism’s “provisionally inexplicable” 
solution to the mysteries of “hidden nature.” Whilst the cause of resuscitation is unknown, 
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that mystery can be approached through the accumulation of observed fact, which becomes 
an established body of knowledge, or, in Cullen’s own phrase, “generalised fact.”  The Letter 
to Lord Cathcart can thus be read as the narrative effect of vitalism’s characteristic 
epistemic structure, its gestural theoretical sketches of the physiological functions involved 
in the recovery of life providing a suggestive and enabling frame within which the proximate 
knowledge of resuscitative practices may be elaborated in detail.  
 Of course, the Letter, designed to communicate resuscitative practices to an 
audience beyond medical specialists, may not be the best place to find extended theoretical 
accounts of bodily operations. Nevertheless, other writings of Cullen’s reinforce the sense 
that the relative brevity of the Letter’s discussion of the vital principle corresponds to an 
epistemology which, given the difficulty of accessing remote causes of bodily operations, 
instead attends to the perceptible experiences of the body. “We learn nothing of the form 
of the disease by taking the cause into the definition,” he asserted, because causes are 
“often conjectural.”30 “Proximate,” or more local and immediate causes, should be 
distinguished from remote ones. As this implies, Cullen’s epistemology is strongly 
Humean.31 Hume had asserted that “to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the 
secret causes of their operations” is “an enterprise … beyond the reach of human 
understanding”; and that “a human body is a mighty complicated machine: … many secret 
powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension.”32 Hume is echoed in 
the Preface to Cullen’s First Lines of Physic where he notes that inquiry into the moving 
powers of the animal œconomy “is difficult: the laws of the Nervous System, in the various 
circumstances of the animal œconomy, are by no means ascertained; and, from want of 
attention and observation with the view to a system on this subject, the business appears to 
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many as an inexplicable mystery.”33 However, the existence of “mystery” does not mean 
entertaining “fanciful hypothesis” or “capricious principle”; rather, it underlines the need to 
attend to the body all the more closely: to use “all the physical and mechanical reasoning 
we might employ concerning the human body.”34 As Hume had asserted, “we can never 
pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover 
themselves to the senses.”35 For both Hume and Cullen, knowledge of living bodies is 
derived from the evidence of the senses, the observation of regular appearances through 
which general laws might be formulated, and the use of probable reasoning: from 
phenomenal, rather than a fully causal, knowledge. Humean epistemology enabled Cullen to 
reject “hypothesis, and what have been called theories,” whilst admitting observations of 
nature as “facts,” and to offer doctrine as a “generalisation of facts.”36 The opacity of his 
account of the vital principle, in both the Letter to Lord Cathcart and in his work more 
generally, follows from this. Not itself an object of inquiry, because not available to 
knowledge of the senses, it is a conjectural cause which aids the generalisation of facts into 
a system. But even if a sophisticated epistemology underlies the opacity of the “principle” 
through which reanimation is brought about, the opacity — even mystery — of that 
principle nevertheless remains.  
 Cullen’s medicine thus posits the body as the site of disease (or other bodily 
phenomena) whose causes become more conjectural the more remote they are from 
observed effects: the body is inserted into a network of knowability which privileges the 
present and proximate against the distant and remote. The moment of reanimation, which 
pits the substantive power of a palpable bodily event against an ever-receding chain of 
knowable causes, could be read as a mise-en-scène of this epistemological state. Even 
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though the remote cause of reanimation (such as the putative vital principle) is unknown, its 
proximate cause (whether heating the body, blowing air into the lungs, application of 
electrical charge, or similar) is known, and its effects made dramatically evident. Equally, 
reanimation constituted a sensational staging of the body’s powerful capacity to override 
the seemingly fatal consequences of its immediate historical experience, thereby 
challenging the usual construction, in Scottish medicine, of the body as passive register of 
material experience.37 Reanimation thus presented a resonant image of somatic power 
countering historical fate, and indeed (in the instance of the reanimation of would-be 
suicides) the agency of the body’s inhabitant.  
   These questions of cause and volition in relation to the life and death of the body 
recur in Hume’s essay ‘Of Suicide’. Although resuscitation literature does not address suicide 
explicitly, there is an obvious link: both resuscitation and suicide concern the intervention of 
human action to bring about, respectively, life to a dead body, or death to a live one. 
Indeed, the Humane Society recognised that resuscitation was regularly practiced on the 
bodies of would-be or actual suicides, as was the case with Wollstonecraft.38 In the course 
of his essay, Hume modifies the sceptical tone of his early Treatise and Enquiry, in which the 
“secret causes” or “powers” of the body are beyond human understanding, to describe the 
act of suicide as “a voluntary action anticipat[ing] the effect of blind causes.”39 The flip side 
of Humean scepticism about knowledge of the body is that volition can anticipate regular 
patterns of events; probable knowledge, based on the regular appearance of observed 
phenomena, is efficacious to the extent that life can be extinguished. Formulated as the 
exertion of will over blind cause, suicide demonstrates the extent of the subject’s powers 
over the body, even in the face of the mystery of the body’s “blind causes.”  
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 For all the controversy over suicide, sufficient for Hume to withhold his essay from 
publication, reanimation posed potentially yet more complex questions of volition, will and 
agency, in relation to both the object and the agent of resuscitation.40 Wollstonecraft 
described her resuscitation as being “inhumanly brought back to life,” suggesting that it 
countered her agency over her own life as a rational, self-directing being.41 Arguably, 
propaganda surrounding the Humane Society, which presented its actions in benevolent 
terms which resonated with the sentimental values of the time, insulated it from criticism of 
the moral implications of its activities.42 But reanimation, as well as reversing suicide, might 
also be considered a repetition of it, in that it repeats, in Hume’s formula, the exertion of 
volition over blind cause. In fact, however, in resuscitation, the epistemological gap – the 
blindness – which in suicide characterises cause, but which can be overwritten by the 
anticipation of volition, becomes more marked, potentially to impede and characterise 
volition too. How reanimation takes place, and indeed whether it will take place at all, are 
both unknown; if it does take place, does the volition which brings it about belong to the 
agency of the resuscitator, or to the body, or to some combination of both?  
Wollstonecraft’s assertion of the right of self-determination implies a faith that volition is 
able to deliver it, even despite the blindness of cause; but reanimation tests the ability of 
others to determine an individual’s bodily fate, exposing the vulnerabilities of volition, both 
in terms of what it can bring about (its powers over the body), and in terms of what, and 
even where, it is.43 Situated at the endpoint of volition’s ability to anticipate cause, 
reanimation thus risked exposing the ‘blindness’ of knowledge, and the limits of acting on 
patterns of regularly observed appearances. Something like an admission of this is conveyed 
in Cullen’s comment in the Preface to his First Lines of Physic, that the “vix medicatrix nature 
[the body’s ability to heal itself] must unavoidably be received as a fact; yet, wherever it is 
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admitted, it throws an obscurity upon our system; and it is only where the impotence of our 
art is very manifest and considerable, that we ought to admit of it in practice.”44 Even 
though, as Jane Shaw states, Hume’s definition of a miracle was the violation of a law of 
nature, it was perhaps the obscurity which surrounded the practice which prompted him to 
state that it was a “miracle, that a dead man should come to life”.45 
 If, for Hume at mid-century, the return of a dead man to life constituted the very 
definition of the miraculous, by the final decade of the century resuscitation was a 
recognised practice, enacted throughout Europe, and celebrated in cultural and 
philanthropic events, sermons, literary and other publications. But these questions of 
volition, agency, and the capacities of bodies to register, or resist, the forces of history, also 
carried a political dimension, ready to be mined in the final years of the century. 
Reanimation, as a trope of resistance to, or overturning of, a seemingly inevitable fate, 
offered itself for obvious exploitation as a way of figuring the transformation of given 
historical reality; the notion of a powerful agency, operating without the intervention of any 
known origin, is equally compelling. What are the politics of an event whose presence 
speaks more loudly than any originary cause? The existence of such questions, implicit 
within medical attempts to theorise reanimation, explains the ease with which discussions 
of resuscitation spilled over into cultural and political domains where their implications 
were explored in different ways by William Hawes and John Thelwall.  
* 
 Hawes and Thelwall provide two instances of the cultural life of vitalism, as 
manifested in the humanitarian culture associated with the Humane Society and in radical 
literary writing.46 As stated earlier, the cultural life of resuscitation in fiction, from 
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Frankenstein onwards, is well-recognised. Fiction presents a realm where the extended 
possibilities of what are often presented in a probabilistic narrative are licensed and enabled 
by the genre’s defining distance from any necessary adherence to proven fact.  Here, I trace 
how the creative possibilities of the credible and probabilistic, combined with the mystery 
which continues to mark resuscitation, are developed in two different directions, in the 
propagandistic addresses of Hawes, and in the literary work of Thelwall. 
 The Humane Society, founded in 1774 by Hawes and others, both depended on and 
further inculcated a humanitarianism characterised by the self-conscious performance of 
philanthropy, charity and sensibility. Its participation in the well-documented sentimental 
culture of affective benevolence which flourished in the second half of the eighteenth-
century enables us to ask whether, and how far, that culture was informed by the vitalist 
physiology on which resuscitation drew.47 If there was a link, I suggest that it had a very 
particular shape or character, which reflected the way vitalism ultimately rested on the 
“provisionally inexplicable,” and which informed the nature of the cultural expressions 
associated with the Humane Society. It is usual for critical studies seeking to explore the 
relationship of scientific knowledge to contemporary culture to identify cultural responses 
to salient scientific facts, discoveries, or theories. By contrast, I suggest, more complexly, a 
relation between the absence of secure scientific knowledge underlining the practice of 
resuscitation, combined with vitalism’s particular methodological manoeuvrings, and the 
flowering of the cultural life of vitalism in the various activities and cultural phenomena 
associated with it.  
 As we have seen, writings on resuscitation typically offer a combination of reticence 
and necessary supposition in their theories of the cause, origin, or operation of life within 
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the animal œconomy, paired with a miscellany of suggested medical interventions. This 
epistemologically-specific culture of knowledge – oriented towards the proven ‘facts’ of 
empirical practice, sceptical of hypothesis, but seeking some form of systematic theoretical 
framework – links medical practice to contemporary Scottish philosophy. I suggest there is a 
direct link between the cultural life of vitalism as incubated by Hawes and others, and the 
particular culture of knowledge in which resuscitative practice was addressed – in which 
methodological circumspection prohibits fanciful hypothesis whilst seeking ‘mysterious’ 
knowledge of obscure aspects of the body’s operation. Indeed, it might be possible to say 
that the cultural life of vitalism was predicated precisely on the heady and suggestive 
combination of the limits of knowledge understood by Cullen and his vitalist colleagues, 
paired with powerfully-felt evidence of practical success in achieved resuscitations. The 
combination of successful practical intervention to save lives, matched with a desire for 
fuller knowledge of the animal œconomy, which in turn was carefully disciplined by 
strongly-felt rules of method in philosophical practice, arguably enabled and stimulated the 
climate of suggestion and possibility exploited by Hawes and others to establish widespread 
acceptance and celebration of resuscitation as an eminent practice of benevolence and 
sentimental philanthropy. What, within the medical and scientific community, cannot be 
explained, but is nevertheless repeatedly recognised as a recurrent phenomenon, found a 
unique place in a culture which was ready to celebrate, promote, disseminate and 
proselytise, and which was less bound by methodological self-regulation. In this context, it is 
notable also, that the activities of the Humane Societies reached a peak in the last decades 
of the eighteenth century, before the comprehensive account of the biological cause of 
death produced by Xavier Bichat at the century’s end.48 From this co-incidence of the 
identification of the cause of death, with the decline of cultural activity in relation to 
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resuscitation, it follows also that the Humane Society’s cultural heyday co-incided too with 
the period in which the knowledge of life was ‘provisionally inexplicable’. It is possible, then, 
that what, in a natural philosophical context, was experienced as an epistemological gap to 
be carefully negotiated, was, in other cultural domains, a spur to creative activity.  
 Hawes’ Address to the King and Parliament of Great-Britain, on preserving the lives of 
the inhabitants (1782) provides one case-study in the transition of a scientific language of 
resuscitation into a different cultural register. It exhibits the same convergence of “medical, 
ethical and philosophical” discourses as McGuire identifies in the sub-genre of anniversary 
sermons preached on behalf of the Humane Society.49 It demonstrates in particular how 
phrases which serve as “provisionally inexplicable” place-holders are transferred and 
elevated, to be given an almost incantatory power within Humane Society discourse. Where 
Stephenson, Cullen, and others are reticent on the “vital principle” which might spark the 
return of life in the body, for Hawes the language of stimulus and sparks is given 
prominence to become a watchword, slogan or refrain – as though it would accrue a 
performative power if sufficiently invoked.50 It is there in the epigraph from Shakespeare’s 
Pericles – “Death may usurp on nature many hours; And yet the first of life kindle again / 
The o’er-presst spirits”  – and on the motto on the medals given by the Humane Society to 
those whose endeavours have saved lives: Lateat Scintillula Forsan (“A small spark may 
perhaps lie hid”). Where Cullen eschewed hypothesis with methodological nicety, Hawes 
embraces the very register of possibility (of which the epigraph or motto is a suggestive 
expression) even at its most unlikely extremes. His insistence in the Address on the saving of 
lives even at the most extreme limits of possibility elevates unlikelihood to a cultic status; 
achieving resuscitation even in the face of extreme improbability, at the very limits of what 
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the practice has previously been known to achieve, only swells the virtue of resuscitator to 
an even greater extent.  
 Indeed, the Address to King and Parliament, in its enthusiastic extension of what 
might be considered possible, offers a hypothetical vision which extends beyond the mere 
recovery of drowned persons as a matter of ‘police’, as in Cullen’s Letter to Lord Cathcart. Its 
is a grander, utopic vison in which all deaths, of the old or young, sick or healthy, sudden or 
prolonged, are potentially reversible through the widespread establishment of institutions 
for the dead, mobilisation of trained medical professionals, systematic rewards, and so on, 
in a way which amounts to an entire revisioning of the social and medical life of the nation. 
In this, it acknowledges, and attempts to alleviate, widespread contemporary concerns 
about general, and in particular urban, population decline; medical practice is here yoked 
explicitly to national (and, given the increasing recognition of the importance of the 
population to national wealth, economic) service. Thus the Address offers a more 
generalised vision of how the Humane Society might protect and preserve the lives of the 
populace, than the more specific act of suicide intervention often addressed in other 
Humane Society discourses.51 Whilst McGuire has stressed the Humane Society’s 
transnational (including colonial) reach and network, Hawes’ Address shows how it could 
also attempt to influence domestic policy within the state. Although McGuire identifies an 
increasingly “nationalist hue” in the discourses of the Humane Society in the last decade of 
the eighteenth century, Hawes’ Address demonstrates that attempts to influence national 
policy existed before this; it also shows that national concerns at this time were marked by a 
primarily sentimental humanist, rather than patriotic, valence.52 In this text, what has been 
brought to life – more than a drowned body – is an entire culture of humanitarianism 
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institutionalised in laws, social regulation and individual practice, a vision which rests on the 
promise of the potential reversibility of apparent death, through the operation of a ‘vital 
principle’ whose powers, because unknown, are reimagined on grand scale.  In Hawes’s 
sentimental vision, resuscitation does not simply bring new life to individual bodies, but 
extends to an imagined revivification and transformation of the entire body politic. 
  In Hawes’s Address, the medical practice of resuscitation is amplified by 
philanthropic discourse into an ethical excess, to describe a benevolent social sublime 
unimpeded by precise knowledge of the biological processes of life and death – indeed, 
arguably sustained by such ignorance. In his philanthropic vision, Hawes anticipates a future 
entirely defined by good works, where the power of humanity and disinterestedness, 
powered by medical technique capaciously evoked, but imprecisely comprehended, is such 
that it is even possible to imagine death itself substantively banished. But Hawes’ inflated 
vision, which elevated the powers of science into an ultimately imaginary realm, was not the 
only cultural response to resuscitation. The sentimental register which for Hawes enables 
the celebration of a heroics of resuscitation met a politically-precise critique in the pages of 
Thelwall’s literary compendium, The Peripatetic (1793), published a decade after Hawes’ 
Address.  
 As a poet and journalist who, in the same year as The Peripatetic appeared, also 
published an Essay Towards a Definition of Animal Vitality, which demonstrated detailed 
knowledge of debates over life’s vital causes, Thelwall might be thought as much a celebrant 
of resuscitation’s cultural possibilities as Hawes himself.53 Indeed, he had acted in just such 
a role earlier in his career, publishing poems inspired by the reports of the Humane Society, 
which depicted morally elevating scenes of reanimation in movingly sentimental detail.54 
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And The Peripatetic itself also offers, in its ‘Digression for the Anatomists’, a poetic 
celebration of the “absolute vitality” of the body which describes the “pure electric fire” 
being imparted to the blood as it is pumped by the heart through the lungs.55 But, in 
keeping with the nature of The Peripatetic as a generically-ambiguous “quasi-novel” or 
“medley” text, influenced by Sterne’s Sentimental Journey and sharing with it the ability to 
at once conform to and satirise sentimental discourse, its treatment of resuscitation escapes 
the sentimental mode through which the story of Belmour, the melancholy Wanderer who 
is the eventual object of resuscitation, has been narrated.56 Instead, the event of 
resuscitation disrupts and displaces the text’s sentimentalism and ushers in a barbed 
exposure of the petty corruption and abuses of the legal and juridical professions, and their 
representatives. The generic hybridity of the text, announced in its subtitle as “politico-
sentimental,” is thus fulfilled, even whilst Thelwall addresses the pressing issue of what 
McGuire has described as the “uneasy” relation of the practitioners of resuscitation to the 
juridicial establishment.57 Far from being an end in themselves, readerly sentiments, 
aroused by the tale of Belmour’s sufferings, are thus refused apotheotic expression in an 
extended effusion over the scene of resuscitation, and are instead directed to the quite 
different concern of the “absurdity” of the laws and practices impeding the work which the 
Humane Society carried out. 
 Belmour’s resuscitation, countering the generic expectations fulfilled by his story 
thus far, is thus a moment of bathos: indeed, the event itself takes place out of sight, 
performed by anonymous medical functionaries, and its outcome is reported rather than 
witnessed.58 Unlike Dr X’s recovery of Clarence Hervey, there is no attempt to be credible or 
probabilistic; where Edgeworth blanks out Dr X’s identity, Thelwall obscures the entire 
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resuscitative scene. If Edgeworth exploits the “agreeable” emotions of surprise and wonder 
produced by the miracle of resuscitation to add to the fascinations of her narrative, Thelwall 
brings sentimental affect up short against politico-juridical facts. Resuscitation gives way to 
the farcical attempt by an inquest man (the coroner’s functionary) to prosecute for the 
removal of a dead body, despite protestations that Belmour was no longer dead; the 
inquest-man further attempts to incite a riot, in order that its leaders can be prosecuted at 
profit to legal practitioners. It is evident that the law has demonstrably failed to keep pace 
with the medical practices which complicate its overly-rigid definition of life and death; 
further, by preventing the removal of a body, it impedes the possibility of saving life, and 
regards heroic resuscitators as objects for exploitation and criminalisation. The scene thus 
constitutes an attack on the stupidity of the law and the self-interest of those who seek to 
profit from enforcing it. Resuscitation’s evident achievements must be accompanied by the 
banishing of self-interest, chicanery, and the unreformed operation of the law. Thelwall’s 
denouncement of the law as “the friend of Oppression, or the foe of Benevolence and 
Humanity,” redirects sentimental language to point out the need to reform the very social 
and legal institutions which for Hawes would have presided over a new era of resuscitated 
life.59 
 For McGuire, 1793, the year in which the Humane Society received royal patronage, 
marks the shift towards what she identifies as its increasing deployment of a nationalist 
rhetoric of British practical benevolence.60 Hawes’ Address suggests something of the 
origins of the inflation of sentimental rhetoric into patriotism. But Thelwall’s 1793 satire on 
the judiciary shortcircuits the sentimentalism which has hitherto safeguarded the work of 
the Humane Society, in an “interruption” of resuscitation’s “interesting scene.”61 This 
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interruption encapsulates the literary strategy of The Peripatetic as a whole, which, as a 
compendium, puts the unknown of the gap, absence, or space at the heart of its generic 
identity. In this, it refuses the systematic totality sought by Cullen, which he acknowledged 
could only be achieved by accepting the “obscurity” of vix natura. Instead, Thelwall blanks 
the potential presence of resuscitation in his text, in order to foreground what is needed in 
the world to enable its ‘miracle’ to be performed. In this, he projects a valuable critical and 
cautionary note into the cultural life of resuscitation, and prompts his reader to reflect that, 
whatever the mysteries, and efficacies, of its medical procedures, the scene of resuscitation 
nevertheless, like so much else at this time, stages the need for a different kind of miracle – 
that of political reform. 
 Cullen’s assertion that the obscure “fact” of the body’s ability to self-heal could only 
be admitted where medical art was impotent, illuminates how contemporary medical 
practice was built around and alongside opaque knowledge of the body. The unknown lay 
similarly at the heart of reanimation narratives in scientific culture and beyond. Whether 
fictional, scientific, or addressing popular sentimental politics, resuscitation narratives 
demonstrated the creative possibilities of the “provisionally inexplicable,” showing how, in 
an epistemologically-specific culture of knowledge, an absence of scientific “fact” enabled 
the flowering of resuscitation’s cultural life. In Belinda and other novels, the surprise and 
wonder prompted by the mysterious event of resuscitation added to fiction’s affective 
power. In vitalist writing, the observable bodily event of reanimation countered gaps in 
scientific knowledge, and offered the proximate knowledge of bodily experience against an 
impossible search for unknowable remote causes. And for Hawes and Thelwall, reanimation 
marked the possibility of imagining different political futures. Posing, fundamentally, the 
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question of the relationship between event and cause, resuscitation addressed an issue at 
the heart of empirical knowledge itself, even whilst bringing it up against the limits of its 
own unknowns: the “secret cause” of life, and the “inexplicable mystery” of bodies. That 
relationship between event and cause is central to the project of narrative too, which, 
whether fictional, scientific or sentimental, seeks to fold the former into a credible account 
of the latter. Narratives of resuscitation show how, effective even in the marked absence of 
knowledge, reanimation asserted the possibility of praxis unshackled from certainty, and a 
way of moving beyond an epistemic scene defined by understanding to one marked by the 
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